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THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON
RULES, STANDARDS, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore*
93 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW __ (forthcoming 2019)
Artificial intelligence (AI), and machine learning in particular, promises
lawmakers greater specificity and fewer errors. Algorithmic lawmaking and
judging will leverage models built from large stores of data that permit the
creation and application of finely tuned rules. AI is therefore regarded as
something that will bring about a movement from standards to rules.
Drawing on contemporary data science, this Article shows that machine
learning is less impressive when the past is unlike the future, as it is
whenever new variables appear over time. In the absence of regularities,
machine learning loses its advantage and, as a result, looser standards can
become superior to rules. We apply this insight to bail and sentencing
decisions, as well as familiar corporate and contract law rules. More
generally, we show that a Human-AI combination can be superior to AI
acting alone. Just as today’s judges overrule errors and outmoded
precedent, tommorrow’s lawmakers will sensibly overrule AI in legal
domains where the challenges of measurement are present. When
measurement is straightforward and prediction is accurate, rules will
prevail. When empirical limitations such as overfit, Simpson’s Paradox,
and omitted variables make measurement difficult, AI should be trusted less
and law should give way to standards.

I. INTRODUCTION
In earlier generations, office workers and homemakers became more
efficient by learning to work with machines. In the present era, our
adjustment to human-machine partnerships is more challenging because
today’s machines, unlike early typewriters, word-processing software, and
washing machines, can now make decisions and improve on their own.
Humans will soon need to decide on a regular basis when to trust and when
to overrule machines. In the case of law, as in the case of autonomous
*
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vehicles and other endeavors, part of this difficulty is that the most
promising advances in AI (artificial intelligence) are opaque; errors are
harder to identify because faulty assumptions and omitted variables are
difficult to identify inasmuch as algorithms cannot be counted on to explain
how they reached their decisions. This Article explores the division of labor
between AI and human lawmakers. First, we suggest that in stable legal
environments, humans should be more hesitant to second-guess machines
than should machines be discounted when they differ with judges and other
human lawmakers. More generally, we show that AI, and sensible
overruling in both directions, will lead to a different mix of rules and
standards in law. In addition, we explain why AI, working alone, has its
flaws, and we do so with examples that touch on pre-trial bail, parole, and
sentencing decisions, and that draw on the laws of torts, contracts,
bankruptcy, and corporations. We show why machines will turn some
standards into rules, and will add specificity to familiar legal rules. In
exceptional but interesting cases, an understanding of the limits of machine
learning will have the reverse effect, as it will encourage law to substitute
some standards—and human judgment—in place of familiar and precise
legal rules.
II. THE COMBINATORY POWER OF HUMANS AND MACHINES
A. The Advent of Combinations
Combinations of, or teamwork between, people and their machines is
not new. Forty years ago it would have been obvious that even the most
talented secretary needed to have good typing skills. The secretary was
judged by an ability to screen office visitors and to take dictation and
improve correspondence, among other things, but these contributions were
especially valued if the employee could type accurately and quickly. There
were advantages of combining humans into teams of workers, but also of
combining the efforts of an employee and a typewriter—a human and a
machine. The two were complements more than substitutes. As the machine
improved, the relative contribution of the human did not necessarily
decrease, and indeed compensation increased until computers enabled more
senior people to rely very little on secretaries.
There is reason to think that the same is true in the modern era with
respect to the relationship between humans and computers, although this
combination is more interesting because some tasks and decisions can be
made by the machine alone, while even the IBM Selectric typewriter
required a human to do anything at all. Machine learning (ML), a subset of
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artificial intelligence, is a term applied to the ability of modern machines to
improve on their own, after some programming about the goals sought by
humans and the sources of data offered to machines.1 The IBM typewriter
was mechanical; a modern word processing program is a simple example of
AI, and it uses structured data2 to correct misspelled words. Moreover, the
word processor engages in machine learning if it is able to suggest
sentences based on the users’ previous e-mails to similar parties. The more
data, in the form of previous messages, user corrections, or favorable
responses by recipients, the better the suggestions are likely to be.
Humans were impressed when machine learning enabled a machine to

1

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a general term that includes things that machines have
done for years. In this Article we use it in a way that refers to the transfer of
decisionmaking, or investigation of facts, away from humans. Machine learning (ML) is
best understood as a subset of AI, as it draws attention to the capacity of a program to
improve on its own. In its extreme, unstructured machine learning, humans initiate the AI’s
work by providing goals as well as data or some instructions about where and how to look
for data, but the machine is free to make connections, reach conclusions, or look for more
data in ways that the human had not contemplated. In many cases, AI and ML are
expressions that can be used interchangeably. But even this description has been
misleading because there are many approaches within the world of machine learning. An
algorithm that imitates evolution, for instance, is not exactly looking for previously
unidentified connections. Moreover, as explained and incorporated below, a machine that
looks only for connections is apt to run into problems of overfit. But inasmuch as
surprising connections have captured the attention of legal scholars, we use terms
consistent with this interest. Indeed, though AI is itself an inclusive term that may not
survive the test of time, we use it here because of its current popularity and because it
reflects our interest in the division of lawmaking power between humans and machines.
AI learns from feedback, which can be divided into three types. In supervised
learning, the AI observes some data, such as arrestee characteristics, and a teacher labels
the arrestee’s bail suitability and amount. Alternatively, an AI might be given video
footage and instructed that it has observed a crime. In unsupervised learning, AI learns
from patterns in the data with no explicit feedback. The learning task primarily consists of
identifying clusters. For instance, an AI taxi might gradually learn to distinguish between
good and bad traffic days without ever receiving labeled examples from a teacher.
Reinforcement learning is a combination of the two. An AI might be ―punished‖ by being
overruled (and thus identified or ―labelled‖), but it is left to the AI to examine patterns and
deduce why it was overruled. In practice, these distinctions can overlap. In semi-supervised
learning, an AI may be given partially labeled and unlabeled data and asked to make a
prediction. Alternatively, all of the data may be labeled, but in a systematically inaccurate
way. See STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN
APPROACH 694-95 (3d ed. 2010).
2
When a machine is given structured data, it is offered inputs or labels in order to
examine a particular correlation or other hypothesis that has been previously developed.
Structured representation of data underlies knowledge-based learning, where there is prior
knowledge about the world. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 1 at 57-58.
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defeat the highest ranked human in Chess and then in the game of Go;3 they
were absolutely dazzled when they learned that the victorious play included
moves and strategies that had not occurred to skilled humans even when the
latter had ample time and years of experience to investigate the possibilities.
It is when the computer does more than capitalize on its ability to follow
human instructions quickly that its artificial intelligence is most noteworthy.
Some of these performances turn out to be overstated,4 perhaps because of a
desire by humans to signal an appreciation of novelty and progress, but
there is reason to think that over time, machine learning will use its
experience and growing databases to improve so that humans will cede
more decision-making to their machines. Machines will undoubtedly
outperform human judges in deciding matters of pre-trial bail, postconviction parole, and which tax returns can most profitably be audited. It is
already the case that only a stubborn adult thinks that he can outperform
Waze or Google Maps in finding the fastest route to a destination, or that
she can choose the best restaurant by asking a friend rather than consulting
an online aggregator—though determining the best online authority for a
given individual is at present a question better allocated to humans.
More remarkable is that the combination of a skilled human and a
machine is often superior to what even the best equipped machine can do on
its own. A machine that defeats humans is often inferior to a machine that a
skilled human can override; the combination triumphs. It may not do so
indefinitely or in all domains, but it is notable at present, and particularly
useful in thinking about legal applications. The success of combinations, or
3

See David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and
Tree Search, 529 NATURE 484, 484 (2016).
4
One important example is the attention paid to research showing that a machine
outperformed human judges in predicting crimes or flight during pre-trial periods when an
arrested person was released on bail; the gains from artificial intelligence were
considerable. See John Kleinberg, et. al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133
Q. J. ECON. 237, 237 (2018). Unfortunately, the competition between these human judges
deciding pre-trial bail and an algorithm instructed to minimize crimes and flight (measured
by a failure to appear at trial) was a bit unfair and proves something quite different from
that often attributed to this work. The machine was given evidence about the successes and
failures of its earlier decisions, while the judges would only occasionally (and by accident)
know whether those they had set free in the past took flight or were again arrested, or
convicted. In machine-learning terms, the judges, and the decision-rules that they were
applying to the pre-trial bail cases, suffered from lack of supervision and reinforcement
and, as a result, performed relatively poorly. In contrast, the algorithm was trained; it was
―supervised‖ and ―reinforced‖ with performance data, and its decision-rules were penalized
for failure and rewarded for success. The real message seems to be that more data, and
learning about the effect of one’s past decisions, is a good idea. This is unsurprising.
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teamwork, is easily understood by considering Freestyle Chess, in which
humans can consult outside sources within a time limit; the champions, at
least for a time, are human-computer partnerships. These combinations
defeat the best machines, and of course the best humans, when these entities
act alone. Nor is there reason to think that a combination of machines or of
humans is superior to one that mixes human with machine. The humans in
Freestyle Chess (or centaur play) appear to have the special, learned skill of
playing with machines; the chess ranking of these partnered humans is well
below that of the leading players in the world, when all are judged on their
success as single, unaccompanied players.
This is an important point, and it is worth restating and exploring. Just
as the best secretary of yester-year might have been one who learned to be a
good typist, so too the most successful freestyle player is apparently one
who has learned to interact well with a machine. In the chess context, the
victorious human is good at knowing when to overrule the machine. This
may not be true in the future, because of the machine’s ability to learn, but
the Human-AI combination is more likely to remain superior in enterprises
like law where the playing field changes over time.5 It changes over time in
chess to the extent that opponents play different moves as they too learn
how to react to a machine or freestyle opponent, but in law, war, and the
stock market, the field is likely to change more because of external events
as well as reactions to moves made by an artificial intelligence or a HumanAI combination. To the extent that AI succeeds because of its ability to
learn from the past, this strength is probably less important the more the
future will not resemble the past.
B. The Role of Humans

5

See infra note 9. Imagine if the rules of chess changed every few years. In the
extreme case, changes to rules would be random and unpredictable, and data would not be
useful for prediction. Only if a pattern is discernible will the machine be able to predict
winning moves.
In this Article, we set aside the interesting philosophical question of how we might
know whether the future is like the past. This is, of course, a familiar riddle of induction,
often examined by philosophers with questions such as how we can be reasonably sure that
the sun will rise tomorrow, posed against the seemingly absurd idea of whether it would
have been reasonable for someone in 1796 to think that George Washington would, in the
future, always command the U.S. armed forces given that he had always done so in the
past. See NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 59 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing
this example). But it is also a practical question, inasmuch as part of the argument here is
that AI’s strength requires some similarity between the past (which is to say the available
data) and the future, while humans may be better at knowing when to trust AI less based on
insights about the likely difference between past and future.
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In freestyle tournaments, as well as in medical care and other settings,
the human takes charge of the combinatory effort, and can ignore or
overrule the machine. The machine can try to overrule the human but
ultimately the next move in the freestyle game, the practice of medicine,
and the operation of a conventional or autonomous car or airplane, is in the
hands of a human. A good human worker knows not to overrule the
machine too often, especially when there is no evidence that the machine
has erred. The superiority of human-directed combinations is surprising if
we think of the machine as powerful simply because of its speedy
calculations. This power helps it examine stored data from previous
encounters and plan several moves ahead. But the machine’s ability to see
new routes to success reflects true machine learning. Skilled humans,
playing on their own, may be overly inclined to value precedent, and often
think that a problem closely resembles one they have seen before. Again,
the combination of human and machine may not triumph in the future, so
long as the playing field remains sufficiently stable, but it is an important
option to consider in lawmaking both because of law’s dynamism and, as
we will see, because it is apt to be politically attractive compared to
unsupervised machines.
1. Goal-Setting and Overrides
At least for the present, we should expect the best lawmakers, including
judges, to be individuals who are adept at evaluating the decisions reached
by machines. With AI, machines will recommend (rather than finalize or
steer clear of) such things as optimal prison sentences, speed limits and
investments in their enforcement, visas, and tariffs. One day they might
even recommend the winners of political contests, rather than simply
predict winners based on humans’ previous voting patterns. It is more
challenging to list decisions that will be or should be free of AI, than to list
areas where machines can be decisive. Machines will be as useful in law as
in the private sector. This leaves two important roles for humans. First,
humans will presumably decide the goals; just as humans decided what
constitutes a victory in chess, so humans will program machines with the
weights that artificial intelligence should assign to efficiency, wealth
distribution, short and long-term climate change (and, indeed, the applicable
discount rate), and so forth.
Second, humans will have the ability to overrule machines in law, as
elsewhere. This power is likely to be a political prerequisite for allowing
ML into lawmaking in the first place. Over time, combinations of humans
and machines will learn how to coordinate and how often to overrule one
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another; a human might simply change the goal midstream, in order to alter
the machine’s conclusion. Humans and machines might compete in their
interpretation of results, but progress should be expected. The evolution of
autonomous vehicles offers a useful example. Humans have already
observed the value of these vehicles and many humans over-emphasize
reported accidents involving experimental vehicles, but over time we expect
humans to outsource decision-making so long as they retain the power to
overrule their machines.6 Lawmakers who block this progress will seem
foolish. Law might help the transition both by holding the owner or
manufacturer of the vehicle strictly liable and, more important, by finding
defendants liable when they had overruled their machines with disastrous
outcomes. On the other hand, various interest groups might cause law to
move in the opposite direction, inefficiently requiring the licensing of new
machines or requiring every vehicle or every program to pass frequent and
costly inspections or even to have two human operators and other
safeguards, as is the case for commercial airliners.7 But competition among
jurisdictions can be expected to bring about socially attractive results,
including taxation, redistribution, and other considerations of interest to
voters and politicians.
2. Data Selection
It is a mistake to think that instructing the AI is always an easy task, and
that the human role in this combination of talents is trivial. Consider, for
example, the case of pre-trial bail.8 The law must decide which arrested
people to release or detain before trial; incarceration is costly in many ways,
but a primary cost of bail is the risk that the individual will engage in
wrongdoing that would not have occurred had he or she been incarcerated.9
6

While overruling might be barred for individual drivers, a driverless car network
operator will retain residual control if not by means of basic design selection.
7
It has even been suggested that AI should undergo an approvals process administered
by a new agency tasked with certifying AI safety. See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating
Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 353, 393 (2016).
8
Pre-trial bail decisions have been a subject of interest in earlier work about AI, see
note 4 supra; it is also discussed below in Section III.A.1.
9
A secondary cost is the danger of decreasing the deterrence effect of criminal law.
We can ignore it here because we are a long way from using AI to evaluate this effect;
inasmuch as each arrestee is unique, machine learning will fail to detect a relationship
between a singular feature of the arrestee and aggregate crime levels. Over time, with more
observations, detection of this feature and its possible relation to crime becomes more
likely. See LESLIE VALIANT, PROBABLY APPROXIMATELY CORRECT 61-62 (2013) (asserting
that detection and learning cannot occur without an observable regularity or pattern). Note
that even if arrestee features are persistent and measurable, learning is not possible if the
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In addition, there is the risk of flight. An obvious instruction is to gather
sufficient data about persons previously released on bail, and ask the AI to
find characteristics that will help predict who should be freed or detained.
The human might set a probability threshold, or might simply ask for the
same percentage of detentions that human judges allowed, if only to
outperform the human judges who acted without AI partners. Either way,
the idea is to release (on bail) those who have a low probability of
committing crimes or fleeing the jurisdiction.
The AI will examine the characteristics of persons released in the past
and discover the factors associated with those who in fact did or did not flee
or commit crimes. It might find that pre-trial release proved successful
when decided by Judge A more often than it did when the decision was in
the hands of Judge B or C. Alternatively, perhaps the amount of bail turns
out to be important. Similarly, perhaps some combination of the identity of
the judge and the nature of the crime for which there was an arrest turns out
to be the best predictor. Finally, perhaps success is associated with a more
rather than less serious crime—something that is unlikely to occur to
humans. An AI is likely to be good at finding such connections if given a
reasonably large data set; the work is mostly automated, except to the extent
that someone must choose what data to collect and possibly label for the AI
to do its work.10 At this point, it might be useful to use AI to discern Judge
A’s decisionmaking process, or ―intuition‖; Judge A might be unable to
articulate the process used, and therefore unable to train other judges.
Similarly, other judges might observe Judge A in action but be unable to
learn how to copy A and achieve a similar level of success. The best judges,
like the best athletes and teachers, are often unable to identify the reasons
arrestee’s environment is constantly changing. See id. (asserting that learning cannot occur
when the context of a generalization is changing). Valiant helpfully denotes each of these
conditions, respectively, as the Learnable Regularity Assumption and the Invariance
Assumption. Id.
Note that here the question is whether a judge or AI is better at deciding pre-trial
releases and bail. There is something of a puzzle in the use of judges at this stage—but then
relying on non-judge parole boards later—following conviction and a period of
incarceration. The difference might be explained by the fact that judges are given the job
when the accused party is in the courtroom anyway, but not otherwise. But the puzzle
would be solved in a mysterious fashion if a study showed that a parole board
outperformed AI, and it would be disturbing if, to the contrary, parole boards were even
worse than judges.
10
If the AI suggests that Judge A was a superb decisionmaker, a good investigator will
suggest data division and further testing, as some judge will by chance turn out to make the
right decisions. But if Judge A turns out to be successful in the set-aside data as well, our
concerns about overfit will be reduced. The problem of overfit is explained and discussed
presently in Section III.A.1.
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for their successes.
3. Data Availability
Note, however, that even if all this works well, the AI’s power has not
been fully tapped. The AI was only offered data about the people who were
let out on bail. The earlier, human decisionmakers might have kept people
in jail who would not have committed crimes if released, but the AI was
unable to test their propensity toward crime or flight because they remained
in jail. In fact, if human or AI decisionmakers systemically detain
individuals with particular untested characteristics (or combinations of
characteristics) then the AI cannot learn how that group of people would
behave while on bail. This might occur because judges or machines have
been instructed by law, or a collective hunch, to always detain people who
have committed crimes of type X or Y, or have personal characteristics of
type Q or R. Assuming a large enough sample, a statistician would like to
randomly select people who were not released, and then let them out on
bail. The AI could then discern the characteristics that identify the subset of
this group that turned out to be well-behaved.
Other approaches might achieve the same result. Consider that AI is not
necessary in the first step; after Judges A, B, and C make their decisions,
bail could be randomly granted to a fraction of arrested and retained persons
whose progress could be followed. Alternatively, a human could guess
other characteristics that judges disfavored, and offer bail to some of them
in order to judge their performance. Indeed, if humans make the earlier
decisions, we might decide to let AI find the disfavored characteristics, and
then select a random sample from this disfavored group to release on bail
and to study.11 There are other variations for lawmakers to contemplate, but
the point is that there is a substantial role for humans in thinking about data
limitations and goal-setting.
4. Expenditures

11

The same is true outside of law. Instead of studying successful employees or law
students, we (or AI) might study the characteristics of successful employees or lawyers at
other firms (or law schools) that ours did not choose, or we might select a random set of
rejected applicants to study. This idea is motivated by Matt Levine, The Robots Learn by
Watching
Us,
BLOOMBERG
(October
11,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-10-11/the-robots-learn-by-watchingus?srnd=opinion. Note that the hiring and admissions examples are relatively harmless,
while the pre-trial bail example runs the risk of extra crimes committed by the control
group, which will be blamed on the AI’s thirst for data.
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To this point, our legal examples have been limited to regulations and
criminal law; nothing has been said about expenditures. Consistent with this
pattern, it is easy to imagine AI determining or suggesting the speed limit
on a bridge. The limit might be different for various kinds of vehicles,
including autonomous cars or trucks, and might vary by the time of day, the
number of vehicles detected on the bridge, the presence of nearby
emergency vehicles, and so forth. It is less likely that AI will determine
when and where to build a bridge in the first place. This is not because AI is
incapable of taking into account the value of commuters’ time, the cost of
bridge building, and other variables inserted by humans (with the assistance
of AI)—but rather because of interest groups and other political influences.
Even in a world where AI instructs to build a bridge of a particular size at a
given location, and AI finances the bridge with perfectly calibrated tolls,
and has chosen the contractor and negotiated the price of construction, it
will be hard to overcome the desire of humans and their politicians to build
the bridge somewhere else and to provide jobs to favored constituents. It is
fanciful to imagine that humans can overcome these familiar weaknesses by
pre-committing to delegate these decisions to AI, just as (outside the world
of science fiction) it is hard to imagine delegation of war-making authority
to AI. At best, AI can be a consultant. It is plausible, as we have seen, that
even AI would see that combining its skills with a human’s skills is
superior. Our intuition is that this sort of tilt away from AI is more likely for
spending decisions than for regulations, for the reasons already suggested,
and also because of the interest of politicians in making irreversible
decisions.12
C. The Role of Machines
A machine that is engaged in supervised or unsupervised learning13
adheres to precise instructions for information processing in order to predict
an outcome regarding a question that a human has previously defined. It is
important to emphasize that AI, and thus machine decision-making, is hardcoded with rules. The very process of assigning a standard or a
discretionary decision to a machine, requires detailed rules;14 true standards
12

See Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Durability of Law in FRANK FAGAN &
SAUL LEVMORE (EDS.), THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 171 (2017) (suggesting that spending
on projects, including bridges and pyramids, reflects a kind of decisionmaking that future
lawmakers are unlikely to undo).
13
See supra note 1.
14
Hard-coded standards, for instance, might consist of a long series of if-then
decisions where only a few of those decisions are required to be explicitly ―well-reasoned
and considered‖ within the final machine-output decision.
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are for human decisionmakers. The same might be said about the ways in
which humans make decisions when instructed with standards, but the
critical difference is that human judges can rely on intuition and, in any
event, (like machines) may be unable to identify their own basis for
decision-making.15
1. Overstated Concerns with ―Unsupervised‖ Machines and ―Opaque‖
Algorithmic Decisionmaking
Note that unsupervised learning does nothing more than permit the
creation or refinement of a rule without further consideration of the
machine’s accuracy, and perhaps without later supervision or reinforcement
of the machine’s success or failure.16 Unsupervised selection of a permanent
associate from a pool of two summer associates at a law firm, for example,
might be based exclusively upon the patterns in performance over the
course of the summer, the patterned performance of past summer associates,
and perhaps the harshness of those who evaluate them. If the hiring decision
is handed over to AI, it might do more; whether supervised or unsupervised,
it might for example include information about the subsequent performance
of past summer associates. Law firm partners are unlikely to evaluate their
own track records of identifying promising associates, but that is primarily
what AI can add with machine learning, so long as it has access to data
about future performance and uses it to assess the accuracy of its past
decisions.17

15

See Linda L. Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 10 L. COMM. &
RHETORIC 1, 1 (2013) (arguing that judicial intuition applied to routine cases often
generates bias, but when applied to new problems that require creativity, it provides
important solutions).
16
AI researchers can of course evaluate the performance of unsupervised methods
such as clustering, but true unsupervised learning is not evaluated. See supra note 1. In
some cases, unsupervised learning finds associations or connections which are tagged, and
subsequently used as input in supervised learning. The performance of the unsupervised
algorithm is then assessed by how much it improves the accuracy of the supervised one.
See George E. Dahl, Ryan P. Adams & Hugo Larochelle, Training Restricted Boltzmann
Machines on Word Observations, arXiv: 1202.5695v2 (2012) (applying this approach to
analyze word representation).
17
Consider that COMPAS, a leading AI tool for predicting recidivism, collects selfreported data from defendants. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016) (noting
that ―[t]he COMPAS risk assessment is based upon information gathered from the
defendant’s criminal file and an interview with the defendant‖). If defendant self-reporting
is systematically biased, then even though the data is labeled by defendants, predictive
accuracy may be increased by using some form of unsupervised learning, such as
clustering, to find incorrectly labeled patterns that predict recidivism.
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This might be an example of isolated work completed outside of the
combination of Human and AI, or it might have taken place because of
good joint work; perhaps a human thought of the value which would be
added by AI and therefore provided the AI with information about future
job performance in the years after associates summer at the firm. Machine
learning can in this way be more rule-based than is generally recognized,18
and even unsupervised learning relies on identifying data for collection. If
truly unsupervised learning is problematic, because of its opacity, it is
because it ignores the role that humans play in goal-setting and identifying
appropriate sources of data for collection. Algorithms that allocate the seats
of an incoming freshman class on the basis of zip codes, for example, may
indeed generate biased outcomes, but it is the human who permitted the data
to be collected in the first place.
2. Machine vs. Judicial Decisionmaking
Consider an algorithm that predicts whether a Delaware judge will
pierce the corporate veil. This algorithm might collect variables such as the
presence of fraud, a bankrupt subsidiary, and the level of capitalization
relative to debt. Using those variables as inputs, the algorithm provides
detailed information on the expected outcome of a piercing decision and
then makes a suggestion.19 When judges apply rules, they engage in a
similar practice. Rules circumscribe their consideration of particular facts
and circumstances.20 While judicial interpretation of both facts and rules
can loosen that restriction, standards permit greater freedom in decisionmaking.21 In this sense, the application of a standard has more in common
with decision-making by the combined effot of humans and a machine—as
judges are paired with AI. Of course, in most cases this intelligence is not
what we commonly call AI, but is rather the intuitions and conclusions
reached by earlier lawmakers who observed some data and offered some
imprecise guidance, outsourcing decisionmaking to future judges. This form
18

CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2016); Brent Mittlestadt et al.,
The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate, 1 BIG DATA AND SOCIETY 5 (2016).
19
In this case, the machine would be engaging in reinforcement learning if it received
output data, such as aggregate corporate debt for one year following the piercing decision,
and used that data when making future decisions.
20
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
L. STUD. 257, 258 (1974) (noting that the difference between a rule and its meta standard is
usually one of degree, just as most standards lie below yet more general aims, or
standards).
21
See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1021-22 (1995)
(noting that rules can never eliminate interpretative uncertainty, but they nonetheless
reduce discretion).
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of combined power is quite similar to that we have associated with HumanAI combinations. It makes little difference whether a modern judge uses
insights offered by a modern machine, a standard constructed by an earlier
lawmaker, or indeed an earlier precedent that can now be overruled. In all
these cases, the combination might or might not reveal the ―reasons‖ for its
suggestion, and the current judge is empowered to use his or her thinking to
decide how much to rely on the available machine.
3. Reinforcement Learning and the Importance of Measuring the
Performance of Human-AI Combination
It is apparent that for AI to know the right balance between machine and
human decisionmaking, it is necessary to have good data about the
performance of both humans and machines. The same can of course be said
about precedent constructed by earlier humans. Thus, it is important to track
the decisionmaking of judges and regulators, in order to compare their
judgments with eventual results. This requires far more data collection than
is currently practiced, with an eye on both structured and unstructured
analysis. The potential advantages of AI require good big data. Just as we
ought to collect more information about the classroom, to see what works in
the world of education, so too we need to gather information about judges
and legal rules, and then the outcomes generated after the application of
standards and rules used by law.
Detailed measurement of judicial performance can identify talented
judges who have good track records of successfully overruling machines (a
word we might begin to use to include earlier judges). Ideally, the judge’s
history of overruling will itself be examined by AI and will inform this and
other judges whether overruling has been done too frequently. The process
is improved if the judge is able to explain, at the time of the decision, why
overruling seemed right. It is also improved if data about performance can
be set aside, and then examined; after all, some judge will look good merely
by chance. By analyzing their decisions in detail, law may make progress in
identifying the true sources of good judicial decision-making, and this can
be useful in instructing other judges. Data collection can in this way lead to
the refinement of a standard or the creation of a new rule.22
III. OVERRULING AI

22

See infra Section IV.B.
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It should be noted at the outset that the attention we now draw to the
problems of overfit, omitted variables, and reversals, do not offer a
comprehensive means of evaluating the optimal balance of power in the
combination of a human with AI. Humans, and especially judges, are
known to suffer from a variety of decisionmaking flaws that are difficult to
overcome even when brought to the attention of decisionmakers. Judges and
other lawmakers (and we) suffer from hindsight bias, unconscious biases,
and many more defects that AI might avoid—though we should not ignore
the impact of biases on the information (the goals as well as classes of data)
given to the AI by humans.23 The issues we raise here are meant to draw
attention to the limits of AI, but we are not suggesting that humans are
perfect decisionmakers.
A good question to ask at this point is what level of confidence should
be required before decision-making is entirely outsourced to the machine or
before a human overrules the AI. In some situations, the second version of
the question is easy. Imagine that an AI makes a startling recommendation
and a human thinks it can identify the source of the AI’s surprising
decision. Perhaps the AI says to drive at 100 miles per hour because it is
clever enough to see not only a safe stretch of road but also that it will make
better decisions in the future if it builds up data about safe driving speeds.24
Whether or not the human understands the source of the AI’s astonishing
instruction, the human might appreciate something not previously included
in the set of goals given to the AI; the human will suddenly see the
likelihood that an accident at such high speed will cause voters to distrust or
de-fund AI. The human knows that an accident at a speed no human
recommends would bring out the worst in voters and consumers, who
would not be satisfied with a developer’s promise to improve the AI’s
instructions. Humans are unlikely to remember all the times that AI lowered
the speed and saved property and lives, just as they presently respond to a
23

See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009) (documenting implicit racial bias in
the decisions of trial judges); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 570, 571 (1998) (asserting that judges and juries
overstate the predictability of past events); see also Daniel L. Chen & Jess Eagel, Can
Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of Asylum Adjudications?, Proceedings of the
16th edition of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law 237, 237
(2017) (documenting judges’ past decisions to grant asylum as predictors of future
decisions).
24
Humans expect an increasing function, while the AI might see that the truth may be
otherwise. The incongruity would be avoided if a human knew to set a goal for the AI that
included the risk that error would lead to pushback. Thus, the AI might be told to see what
minimizes serious accidents over a weighted ten year period or to weight endangered
parties’ lives in a way that accounts for their apparent ages.
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reported accident involving an autonomous vehicle without properly
weighing all the accidents that humans cause and AI avoids.
But now consider overrides in the other direction. Imagine a case where
the human lawmaker insists that a factory should be required to mitigate
pollution in some manner, but the AI partner surprises by suggesting that
the polluting activity go unmitigated and that, instead of adhering to
previously established environmental law rules, the factory owner (or
government) should pay two other factories on the same river to operate
fewer hours a day so as to improve the ecosystem at lower cost. Put
differently, the AI sees a Coasian bargain where transaction costs or a
failure of imagination inhibited human regulators and social progress. How
certain should a human lawmaker be that the AI is wrong before
intervening? The human may calculate that the AI is more likely than not to
be wrong; perhaps it seems incorrectly instructed about the costs and
benefits of displacing employees in closed factories. An important literature
suggests that a more-likely-than-not, or 51% certainty, is error minimizing
and efficient; the negligent or strictly liable defendant should pay full rather
than probabilistic damages.25 But now the AI has presumably used big data
to calculate costs and benefits, and it has determined that there is a 52%
chance, let us say, that an exception to existing environmental law is
appropriate. In turn, the human regulator has calculated that with similar
probability the AI has incorrectly assessed the true costs of change. Our
claim is that the AI should be trusted (and not overruled) more readily than
the human when humans are confident in the precision of their specification
of AI’s goal (as discussed in Section II.C.1 above); when the legal domain
is sufficiently stable over time and new variables are unexpected to appear;
and, where causal models draw on AI to identify important variables, that
these models are robust to data division, especially when omitted variables
may be a problem. Our concern with stability is reflected in errors generated
by overfitting a predictive model. Concerns with robustness are reflected in
errors generated by omitting important variables (or by misspecification
generally) in a causal model. We take up both of these in turn.
A. Overruling On the Basis of Overfit
AI’s accuracy depends upon whether the relationship or pattern that it
has identified exists in the real world. From the outset, it is important to
25

David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiable
Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 7 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 487, 487
(1982); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 691, 691 (1990).
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note that contemporary machine learning (ML) is generally used to make
predictive inferences; it might for example indicate that the presence of
characteristics X, Y, and Z predicts that the bailee is a flight risk. A policy
which eliminates characteristic X from the population, say, by increasing
everyone’s income by $1,000 per month, may or may not cause a given
defendant to be marked as someone who presents a low risk of flight from
the jurisdiction. Researchers are actively working toward supplying AI with
the tools of causal reasoning to reach stronger conclusions.26
In statistics, randomized experiments are the gold standard for
identifying a causal relationship.27 Random sampling from a population,
and random treatment across a subset of that sample with a drug or policy,
for example, sharply reduces omitted-variable bias.28 The challenge for law
is that random experiments are rare; jurisdictions create rules for reasons,
and their random application, even within jurisdictions, is scarce if not
legally risky.29 The implication is that the traditional approach of increasing
the number of independent variables to combat omitted-variable bias does
not translate well to law. As we will see, there remains a worst-case
scenario where a causal inference is not only wrong, but the reverse of what
is empirically apparent.
Predictive models promise to alleviate the drawbacks of causal
inference and omitted-variable bias, but they face their own challenge of
―overfit.‖ Indeed, we might say that all searches of multiple variables for a
26

See Judea Pearl, Theoretical Impediments to Machine Learning With Seven Sparks
from the Causal Revolution, arXiv: 1801.04016v1 (2018) (noting that advances in
graphical and structural models have made counterfactuals computationally tractable and
that machines can be equipped with the tools of causal reasoning).
27
See generally, RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (Hafner Publ’g
Co., 6th ed. 1951) (1935).
28
Omitted-variable bias occurs when a relevant variable that actually belongs in the
true population model, and is correlated with an identified regressor, is excluded from the
statistical model hypothesized by the researcher. Because the variable is excluded, the
model is said to be ―underspecified.‖ Any estimates of the magnitudes or signs of the
included variables may be incorrect, or ―biased‖ as a result. Properly randomizing
treatment application across a sample does not reveal omitted variables, but it ensures that
the treatment and omitted variables are uncorrelated, which ensures that omitted-variable
bias does not arise in turn. See JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS:
A MODERN APPROACH 88-92 (5th ed. 2013).
29
See Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U.
PENN. L. REV. 929, 964-74 (2011) (discussing the potential need for informed consent for
inclusion in a legal experiment and possible equal protection violations for those who are
excluded from the random application of a rule). On randomized law’s uneasy relationship
to equal protection, see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178-84 (1986) (discussing
problems with arbitrariness).
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best fit suffer from the danger of overfit, but that the risk of AI in this
regard is likely greater than that faced by human data analysts because the
latter begin with theory and look at few variables.30 Machine learning
primarily relies on raw data, as opposed to theory, to construct models and
generate testable hypotheses. Because its models are presently data-driven,
it faces a tradeoff between demanding that new observations for
classification or prediction perfectly match all of the features of the existing
data set from which a model is constructed.31 For instance, a model may
only identify a Coasian bargain for mitigating pollution if a factory shares
identical features of all previous factories where Coasian bargains made
sense. This form of algorithmic rigidity, or overfitting of the data to the
model, may hide other worthwhile bargains from the policy-maker’s reach.
On the other hand, if an algorithm permits too much dissimilarity, it may
erroneously classify a factory as ripe for a bargain, when a bargain, for a
factory with these additional unconsidered and unmodeled features, actually
leads to social loss.
1. An Example of Overfit with Respect to Judicial Precedent
Most lawyers are familiar with overfit, but perhaps not by that name.
The use of precedent can be understood as the judicial strategy, or
restrictive principle, of fitting a classification rule to the evidence. Common
law rules are developed and refined over time by the presentation of various
configurations of facts and circumstances to courts. The facts and
circumstances are analogous to training data that generate a model rule,
which a court applies to a future set of facts and circumstances in order to
rule on and ―classify‖ a case. A correctly decided case strengthens the
classifier and increases the likelihood that a new case will be properly
classified. If a lower court interprets precedent too loosely, and attempts to
shoehorn the facts to the rule, then it has overfit the case; in principle, the
error is corrected on appeal.
2. Overfit in the Process of Releasing Arrested Felons on Bail

30

Large data sets enabled by big data collection often contain an extremely large
number of variables, and a choice must be made in order to reduce their number to a level
manageable for causal inference. A good match can be superior to a perfect one, if the
former is located with a theory that proves useful in predicting the future as it identifies
causal factors; theory might be robust in the face of change, while AI knows only the past.
See Pearl, supra note 26 at 6 (noting that the problem of robustness in the face of
environmental change requires a causal model, which ―cannot be handled at the level of
Association‖).
31
These new observations are held out while constructing the initial model.
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In terms of AI, and its ability to make predictive inferences, the problem
of overfit is always present so long as an additional observation adds at least
one new variable to consider. This can be difficult to understand because
new data that confirms a hypothesis normally increases the posterior
probability that the hypothesis is correct. If Judge A thinks that every
person arrested for a felony should be released on bail only if the bail is
greater than $1 million, and someone released by Judge B on $500,000 bail
commits a serious crime, A’s thinking about the million dollar rule is
strengthened; B released the person on bail set below $1 million, and sure
enough a serious crime followed. But this new piece of data also, and
almost necessarily, introduces a new variable. The most recently observed
and released person might have enough money saved to flee the jurisdiction
and have his face altered, or he might not have a job waiting for him, or he
might have been released on a Wednesday. In principle, any of these
factors, or a combination of them, might increase the chance that another
hypothesis best fits the available (past and newly arrived) data. It may be
that Judge B’s judgment is terrible and now it will become evident that
anyone whom B wants to release requires bail of $2 million or an ankle
bracelet. It may be that a secure job is a better predictor than is the amount
of bail because the case sent to B involved an arrested person without a job,
and a new study of the data, old and new, now shows that unemployment is
a better predictor than the amount of bail, or that job insecurity combined
with a $600,000 bail cutoff is the best predictor, and so forth. In short, the
new piece of data might raise the posterior probability attached to the one
million dollar rule, but it might also require further study because it
introduces the possibility that another variable is more important than the
amount of bail. If the goal is precision about preventing crimes and flight,
then even as the algorithm benefits from new data, it loses in the sense of
needing to examine or re-examine other variables. A new observation can
make the old algorithm look worse for obvious reasons, as it would if Judge
B set bail at $1.2 million but a crime was experienced, or if B set a low bail
and no crime followed. But the more difficult point is that the new
observation may appear to confirm the value of the previous rule, but it may
also prove to make another rule superior.
This problem, if that is the right word, is not easy to solve, as the
machine investigates a larger number of hypotheses (and note that the
characteristics of the new piece of data need to be combined with all other
characteristics because the winning formula might be something like ―bail
amount and waiting job and an ankle bracelet and wearing a tie in the
courtroom‖) it locates omitted variables but has more trouble discerning
true connections. The problem of overfit is now apparent: with enough
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variables and attempts to find a theory, there is a good chance that the best
fit was nothing more than a random result.32 Some combination of features
is bound to look like the best predictor of the desired result. Ideally, we
would divide the data and see how the best predictor fairs with the set-aside
data. But this approach is not ideal for lawmaking because circumstances
change. The best predictor of successful release on bail in 1995 might be
expected to be very different from the most important variables in 2019.
Ideally, we would wait for new data; this comes quickly in some settings,
like testing remedies for the flu, but it is impossibly slow for many legal
applications. If greater value is attached to more recent observations, then
the number of useful observations is reduced. While big data may virtually
eliminate the problem of overfit in some legal domains where law is
relatively settled, new forms of human activity and its regulation will suffer
from limited data, weak models, and overfit. Learning cannot occur, and is
certainly less reliable, when the context of a generalization is changing.33
B. Overruling AI on the Basis of Omitted Variables
AI and machine-learning applications are generally used for predictive
inference, but in some cases lawmakers wish to make causal inferences. If
policy X is adopted, will adoption cause outcome Y to occur? As noted
above, the challenge of developing accurate causal models involves
identification of a model for testing. Presently, researchers are beginning to
use machine learning to help predict (and ultimately identify) important
variables for causal models and to select correct causal model structures.34
In this way, the future of ML presents a mix of predictive and causal
reasoning that is susceptible to both overfit and omissions.35 If lawmakers
32

See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 1 at 705, which provides the example of
attempting to predict that the roll of the die will turn up as 6 by collecting data on the color
of the die, the time of day the die is thrown, its weight, and whether the experimenters
crossed their fingers when casting. They note ―[i]f it turns out that there are 2 rolls of a 7gram blue die with fingers crossed and they both come out 6, then the algorithm may
[erroneously] construct a path that predicts 6 in that case.‖ Id. The solution to this danger
is, presumably, to try the algorithm on future or set-aside tosses of dice in order to expose,
and then correct for, the overfit. Another solution is to trust the initial theory, usually
devised by humans, that tosses produce random outcomes, and that each toss of a die offers
a 1 in 6 chance of turning up a 6.
33
See VALIANT, supra note 9 (discussing the Learnable Regularity Assumption and
the Invariance Assumption).
34
See, e.g., Frank Fagan, Big Data Legal Scholarship: Toward a Research Program
and Practitioner’s Guide, 20 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2016) (noting that machine learning
can be used to identify correlations between judicially determined facts and decisionmaking, which can later be used for causal inference).
35
Cf. Pearl, supra note 26 at 6 (noting the necessity of developing causal models when
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rely on AI to make causal inferences, even indirectly through AI’s
assistance in specifying a causal model, then lawmakers should be skeptical
when these models fail basic robustness checks, such as split-sample
analysis, since failures suggest that omitted-variable bias may be present.
1. The Omitted Variable Problem in Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy law offers one area in which the omitted variable problem is
easy to see. Suppose that a causal model shows that an absolute priority
rule, which can be overridden with a majority vote, preserves the largest
percentage of wealth of a debtor’s estate when contracting after bankruptcy
is barred.36 Imagine further that a second study examines two groups of
debtors: group A consists of debtors with more than six tranches of credit,
and group B with fewer than six. When examining groups A and B together,
a majoritarian absolute priority rule, which bars ex post contracting,
maximizes the wealth of debtors, and has no unattractive third-party effects.
However, if the groups are evaluated separately, then the relationship
reverses for both A and B; a majoritarian absolute priority rule which
permits ex post contracting maximizes wealth.
What might cause such a reversal in this center-piece of bankruptcy
law? The most obvious reason is that the first study failed to include a
categorical variable which would have captured the difference above and
below a certain number of creditors. Earlier work has shown that
information asymmetry between corporate managers and creditors leads to
deviations from the absolute priority rule.37 Perhaps the presence of fewer
tranches is correlated with greater asymmetry and deviations, inasmuch as
dishonest managers can only fool a few creditors. In turn, greater
asymmetry and deviations are negatively related to wealth irrespective of
permissible ex post contracting. When ignoring the tranche threshold,
information asymmetry between corporate managers and creditors is
effectively ignored, and causes the reversal.
machine learning is not robust to changing conditions).
36
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 mandated an absolute priority rule and provided for no
majority override. The Act was amended in 1978 to permit majority override, but postbankruptcy contracting still remains controversial. On the history of the Act, see DAVID A.
SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2003). For
a discussion of the merits of ex post contracting, see David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis,
Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm, U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
37
Maria Carapeto, Explaining Deviations from Absolute Priority Rules in Bankruptcy,
3 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 543, 555 (2006) (providing evidence that when payments in
equity (a proxy for management’s overstatement of firm value to creditors) constitute a
larger proportion of total consideration, deviations from absolute priority tend to occur).
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A less obvious reason is that the first study may have identified a
statistically significant relationship, but only for a fraction of the debtors’
estates observed. We can think of the majoritarian absolute priority rule
(barring contracts after bankruptcy) as a ―treatment.‖ Perhaps out of a total
of 5,000 observations, there are 1,000 observations of debtors’ estates
where this treatment is applied. Of those 1,000 observations, 550 experience
an unambiguous increase in wealth relative to the 4,000 observations which
are given no treatment. In other words, the treatment increases wealth 55%
of the time within the observable data. Even if the relationship between the
treatment and this relatively frequent increase in wealth is statistically
significant at conventional levels, the empirical result suggests fragility. The
greater the number of observations and the higher the percentage of
observations showing an increase in wealth, the more confident we can be
that the connection is noteworthy and not fooled by an omitted variable.38 If
45% of the estates experience no increase in wealth following treatment,
then evaluation of an additional variable, such as the number of creditors
above or below six, might lead to empirical indeterminacy, or suggest an
alternative rule. Consideration of this additional variable effectively
unmasks what dividing the data into subgroups for validation reveals,
namely the importance of creditor structure and information asymmetry for
determining the rule’s effectiveness.
A reversal is dramatic. It may be that dividing observations into
subgroups, or adding variables, only leads to indeterminacy.39 When the
statistical significance of correlations and causal relationships merely
collapses as the result of additional empirical study, no new rule is
suggested and law might simply go unchanged. But suppose further study
considers the number of creditors as a continuous variable (as opposed to a
discrete variable, indicating whether the number of creditors is greater or
less than six), and it also fails to reveal a statistically significant relationship
between ex post contracting and the wealth of a debtor’s estate. This result
would suggest that the second empirical study is fragile, and that the
relationship between creditor structure, information asymmetry, and the
timing of contracting is not sufficiently understood. Plainly, some important
variable remains undetected or incompletely measured. Law may do well to
respond here with a standard; the standard would allow the bankruptcy

38

On the relationship between the strength of the effect under consideration and the
confidence one can place in the results of significance testing, see infra note 47,
particularly the discussion of ―statistical power.‖
39
See infra Section IV.C.
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judge to decide whether ex post contracting should be permitted.40
2. The Limitations of Using Machine Learning to Detect Omitted
Variables
A machine learning algorithm may fail to detect an important variable
if there is too little data to distinguish among candidate hypotheses. A
conjunctive machine-learning algorithm, for instance, formulates a new
hypothesis each time the data accounts for an additional variable; an
absolute priority rule’s relationship to creditor joint-wealth may depend on
the number of tranches, the presence or absence of an equity trance, the
proportion of payments in equity, the relative magnitude of senior to
subordinate tranches, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy, and the tenure of
the current board. The number of possible hypotheses grows exponentially
for each additional variable observed.41 Suppose the AI draws each
hypothesis at random and resolves to keep the one that best matches the
data. While more data would reduce the number of hypotheses that survive,
some will still remain if an analysis begins with bad hypotheses. In
principle, the AI can compute the amount of data needed to approximate a
correct hypothesis, but in practice the amount of data will be limited.42
For this reason, AI tests the accuracy of its chosen hypothesis on new
data that is set aside during its initial development. Researchers often
subject identified patterns and superior hypotheses to significance testing in
order to combat overfit.43 A hypothesis that identifies 800 increases in
wealth versus 200 non-increases is probably accurate, but not if it is the best
one among several thousand hypotheses. Achieving 80% accuracy once in
several thousand attempts can easily occur by chance. Some false
hypotheses will inevitably be accepted, but by rejecting statistically
insignificant ones and testing those that remain with new data, overfit can
be controlled. (Another method is to prefer simpler hypotheses.) If the
model continues to fit the data too tightly and the same mistakes continue to
surface (with bias), the combination of Human-AI can introduce more
flexibility through overruling or reducing the required threshold for
significance.

40

See infra Section IV.C.
See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 73 (2015).
42
See VALIANT, supra note 9 at 74 (explaining that the number of hypotheses usually
exceeds the number of observations since new observations introduce new variables that
expand the hypothesis set).
43
See DOMINGOS, supra note 42 at 73-74.
41
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C. Overruling AI on the Basis of Type II Errors
1. An Example of Type II Errors in Veil-Piercing Corporate Law
Consider an empirical study which shows that a judicial finding of
undercapitalization has no statistically significant relationship with a
judicial decision to pierce the corporate veil. Suppose that other variables—
such as categorical variables reflecting the presence of fraud, bankrupt
subsidiaries, or subsidiaries that can avoid statutory obligations such as
CERCLA liability if the assets of the parent remain inaccessible—are
statistically significant at the conventional 5% level.44 This means that
there is a 5% chance of observing those relationships in the data even if
those relationships do not exist; we may be fooled by randomness. In
principle, the relationships may be real and could be expected to show
themselves again in an overwhelming number of repeated inquiries.
There are at least two reasons why these results may, nonetheless, fail to
replicate. Consider first the lack of evidence of undercapitalization’s
significant effect. A study that follows convention, and sets the threshold
for statistical significance at 5%, will fail to identify a relationship between
undercapitalization and veil-piercing if the data reflects just a 6% chance of
observing that relationship at random. This means that there is a 94%
chance that the relationship could actually exist.45 For this reason, as the
threshold for statistical significance increases, the possibility of failing to
reject the hypothesis that undercapitalization has no effect when it actually
could have an effect (a Type II error) increases. If the threshold for failing
to reject the relationship is set to 1%, but the data reflects just a 2% chance
of a random relationship, then there is a 98% chance that a similar study
will find that the relationship between undercapitalization and veil-piercing
could actually exist. Even if predictive models are unconcerned with
significance testing on their own, researchers use testing and other rules of
exclusion to select among candidate models and compare performance.46
The danger of failing to exclude an incorrect, or less accurate, model thus
44

See Jonathan Massey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real
Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014) (providing
empirical evidence that fraud, bankruptcy, and the advancement of federal statutory
purpose predicts a judicial decision to veil-pierce, but that a factual finding of
undercapitalization does not).
45
More precisely, if the researcher’s initial belief before the study (the alternative
hypothesis) is that undercapitalization predicts veil-piercing, failing to reject its converse
(the null hypothesis) does not imply that undercapitalization does not predict veil-piercing.
The study simply fails to reject the null.
46
See DOMINGOS, supra note 41, at 87.
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remains.
2. The Severity of Type II Errors in Law
The problem just discussed can be particularly severe in law, and it
suggests a significant role for lawyers and lawmakers. Apart from its
importance in coordinating society, enabling transactions, and creating
Pareto-improvements, much of law draws a sharp line between winners and
losers. A rule which permits contracting after bankruptcy favors some class
or classes of creditors at the expense of others. A plaintiff may have no
claim against an undercapitalized defendant if undercapitalization were
statutorily abolished as a veil-piercing rationale. In contrast, a drug found to
be ineffective during trials does not suggest that patients should be treated
with another drug, readily at hand, or left to suffer with no drug at all.
Moreover, medical treatments are not mutually exclusive; in law, on the
other hand, mutual exclusivity is the norm as in the case of speed limits or a
rule permitting or forbidding ex post bankruptcy contracting. If a medical
treatment is effective for only 55% of the population, the other 45% does
not suffer from submitting to that treatment, absent side effects. In any case,
the patients still undergo different and additional treatment if the initial one
fails.
This difference between law and medicine is systematic, and the
argument in this Article is not simply a matter of picking favorable
examples to justify its claims. In law, rules that simultaneously assign
mutually exclusive rights, normally create winners and losers. While some
medicinal treatments may be mutually exclusive because of finality
(amputation) or time (daily travel to a treatment center, or taking drugs with
short-term effects), these are exceptions. Most treatments are additive.
Legal rules that favor one group at the expense of others, or that
simultaneously permit and forbid behaviors, are particularly susceptible to
reliance on flawed empirical research – because of predictive inaccuracies
or causal errors. There is a cost to permitting person A to do something that
is socially costly, but there is an additional cost if the same rule forbids
person B from doing something that is socially valuable. When one group
receives an unwarranted benefit at the expense of another, the rule does not
simply reward members of the first group; it makes the second group worse
off. Empirical missteps in law are in this way often amplified.47 The same is
47

Fashioning rules on the basis of Type II errors, or failures to reject false null
hypotheses (such as undercapitalization does not predict veil-piercing) when those
hypotheses should be rejected, is problematic. It is often thought that Type I errors can be
limited and controlled by strengthening the significance threshold. If, for instance, the
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true for expenditures, though the negative effect is often dispersed and
unnoticed; building a bridge in the wrong location but in favor of one
interest group, usually affects another, either because its members must now
travel far to the bridge or simply be taxed for construction that benefits
them not at all.
D. Overruling or Preferring AI because of Simpson’s Paradox
The problems posed by omitted variables is even worse when
examination of the data is susceptible to ―reversal paradoxes,‖ for then an
inference is not just inferior to other techniques, but it is very wrong. In
these instances, law will do well to abandon its reliance on rules, and
instead prefer standards, or other forms of flexible decisionmaking.48
A reversal, or Simpson’s Paradox, generally requires a different
distribution of observations in the sets of data that are compared; it is more
likely to surface when there is a small number of observations and when the
degree of certainty about a conclusion is low. For these reasons, it is more
likely to arise in causal than in predictive inference, though predictions of
outcome A may reverse to B (or not-A) if a predictive model is susceptible
to overfit or omissions.
1. An Example of Reversals in the Context of Evaluating a Law Firm’s
Summer Associates

relationship between an event, such as the announcement of a merger, and increased stock
price is significant at the 5% level, we can be even more certain that the observed
relationship is not a product of random chance, by tightening the significance threshold to
1%. As we have seen, alteration in the threshold does not come without its cost, as it
increases the study’s susceptibility to Type II errors. Suggesting the absence of a causal
relationship between the merger announcement and increased stock price, even at the 1%
level, could be erroneous on its own if the study lacks sufficient statistical power. ―Power‖
is the probability of correctly identifying an effect within a population. Statistical power
decreases with smaller significance thresholds, sample sizes, and effects under
investigation – that is, the strength of a relationship between two variables. Of these three,
effect size introduces the greatest uncertainty in a study. If the price impact is small, an
inference that the announcement caused such impact, even if statistically significant, could
be erroneous. See Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits
of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEXAS L. REV. 552, 618 (2018) (noting
that a significant effect between events and changes in stock prices may go undetected if
that effect is small); Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low
Power, Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583, 600-01 (2015) (same).
48
On standards, see infra Section IV.C. On other forms of flexible law, see, e.g., Frank
Fagan, Legal Cycles and Stabilization Rules, in FRANK FAGAN & SAUL LEVMORE (EDS.),
THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 11 (2017) (discussing contingent rules).
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Imagine a law firm looking to make an offer to one of two summer
associates, Kim and Kit. The firm decides to score the associates on
assignments given to them while they summer at the firm. During the first
month of the summer, Kit is given one corporate assignment and deemed to
have done a poor job on it. Meanwhile, Kim is given four assignments in
that department and is graded as a success on one of them. During the
second month, the two are assigned to the environmental group. Kit
receives five assignments and succeeds on four. Kim is deemed to have
successfully completed the two assignments given in the same department.
The firm tabulates the reviews and decides to hire Kit because Kit
impresses on 4 of the 6 assignments, while Kim impressed partners on just
3 of the 6. But then a partner points out that perhaps the corporate
assignments were simply more difficult, or the corporate partners graded
more ferociously than those in the environmental group. Indeed, Kim
performed better than Kit on the corporate assignments, and also better than
Kit on the environmental projects. Each department would prefer Kim over
Kit, even though Kit’s overall score was superior. This is a classic reversal
paradox; in this example the reversal easily came about because the summer
associates were not (and probably could not be) given the same
assignments, and not even the same number of assignments in each
department. Note that a further, or double, reversal paradox is possible.
Perhaps partners tend to give high scores in the morning, and Kit was
always evaluated in the afternoon. Had they both been evaluated in the
morning, or afternoon, Kit would have been thought superior in both
departments, and on both morning and afternoon assignments.
Even if Kim and Kit had been given the same assignments, from the
same partner and at the same time of day, reversal would continue to be a
danger because of their dissimilar innate abilities and characteristics. Kim
may be bilingual and able to complete immigration cases more quickly than
Kit. Kit may be better at managing work-life balance and coping with stress
than is Kim. Any model that omits variables that account for those
dissimilarities is systematically biased and consequently fragile. No single
variable describes successful completion of a law firm assignment. Thus,
one evaluator may consciously or otherwise reward good writing, while
another is drawn to the summer associate’s ability to produce a memo
quickly. Such differences can bring about a reversal paradox when partners
simply use a generic variable like ―ability,‖ and make future success less
predictable, until specific variables are identified.49 The disparate outcomes,
49

Even with a specific variable, reversals are possible. For example, a coach may like
speed in a race, but one runner may be faster when the running path includes hills, while
another wins when the weather is between 60 and 65 degrees. As described presently in the
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even when Kim and Kit are given an identical task in an identical manner,
reveal ―heterogeneous treatment effects,‖ and these effects across people,
business entities, or other objects of study, can generate reversals, as they
are a manifestation of omitted variables. It is simply the case that hidden
variables can bring about reversals.
It is common to rely on empirical evidence but to question researchers
about omitted variables. When Kim is preferred after the initial analysis of
performance, someone whose intuition was to favor Kit might have pointed
out that Kit’s assignments were more difficult or that Kit was evaluated by
partners who tended to be tough graders. If the omitted variable—
difficulty—were properly included, the result would have been different.
But in most cases this would mean that one department would favor Kit
over Kim or that the overall scores would be different. The remarkable
thing about the special case of a Simpson’s Paradox is that an omitted
variable causes both departments to favor one result, while the overall,
combined score still favors the opposite result, even when all known
variables are included. The practical and often startling lesson is that even
when an empirical study is questioned because of some omitted variable,
and that variable is included in further study, the result may still favor X
over Y, even though Y is superior to X in every setting. This will not occur
if one knows exactly how to weight the omitted variable, but the weight
itself is often unknown or unmeasurable, and can, in any case, be thought of
as an additional omitted variable. Assigning a weight or properly modeling
a relationship is often difficult, and it is hard or even impossible to know
when it has been done correctly.50 Thus, in the law firm case, if one partner
suggests that Kit may have been given more difficult assignments, and Kit’s
scores are therefore increased by some percentage, a reversal paradox may
yet occur because the increase was imperfectly sized, and lower than
required to escape the paradox.
Reversal paradoxes can be understood as a subset of the problem of
omitted variables, but it is a particularly interesting subset both because of
the startling reversals and because these problems are more difficult to solve
than the mere additional testing that can respond to most skepticism based
on omitted variables. Dividing and validating data is a practice that avoids
many problems in empirical work, and it can reduce the risk of reversals. If
text, hidden variables are the stuff of reversals.
50
While large data sets and reliance on prediction can lessen the need for causal
inference, empirical models which identify the structure of a predictive relationship with
big data can suffer from overfit; the model may correspond too closely to the data and fail
to reliably predict future observations as a result. See supra Section III.A.1.
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there are 20,000 patients with a disease and the scientist wants to test
combinations of drugs, it is usually wise to find the winning combination on
a group of 10,000 randomly chosen patients, and then test this finding by
applying it to the previously untested, or set-aside, 10,000. In our
necessarily (and unfortunately) smaller case, if Kim and Kit are evaluated
over two summers, rather than one, and Kim earns higher total scores in
both summers, it is less likely that Kit was unknowingly given more
difficult assignments or graders in each of the two summers. It would
probably be a mistake to sum the scores over both summers as one set of
data, because a hidden reversal paradox is more likely in one comparison
than in two. On the other hand, data division is more attractive when there
are many observations, and there are already so few in the law firm example
that a division of the two sets of data into tiny sets is likely to make the
decision less rather than more reliable. Moreover, a conventional division
would hardly be random. Data division, followed by validation, is almost
always a good idea when ―big data‖ are available;51 a random division of
the data has become a best practice, although modern techniques often
encourage a division that leaves more recent observations in the second data
set, where the lessons derived from the first are tested. After all, we are
usually eager for results that will work in the future. 52 We can think of this
strategy as selectively random. Another solution to the reversal paradox
problem might be to increase the number of observations. If the
assignments are broken down so that Kim and Kit are scored on 20
assignments rather than 6, it is more likely that the difficulty factor averages
out.
2.

An Example of Omitted Variables and a Reversal with Respect to
Autonomous Vehicles

It is apparent that reversal paradoxes can occur in the context of
comparing AI and human performance and thus make it difficult to know
when the AI should be overruled. Our discussion therefore turns to a few
examples of the paradox in this context. We begin with the now familiar
question of Human-AI interaction with respect to autonomous vehicles, and
then imagine cases that will arise in making law.
51

Predictive models are generally trained and tested with set-aside data. Current
techniques, such as k-fold cross-validation, divide the data into a number of random
partitions for estimating model performance; accuracy rates are assessed for each partition,
or fold, to determine adjustments to the model. See BRETT LANTZ, MACHINE LEARNING
WITH R 319 (2013).
52
Note that this approach essentially omits observation of time-dependent effects,
though perhaps the bigger pitfall with data-generated models is overfit, described supra in
Section III.A.
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Consider the case of a human investigator who has reason to think that it
is 60% likely that an accident involving an autonomous vehicle, relying on
AI, was caused by the AI’s error. One possibility is that the misstep might
really be blamed on a human’s failure to take an outcome, or goal, into
account in programming the AI in the first place. Perhaps after the AI and
automobile have been in use for some time, the human considers 100
accidents that have occurred and sees that in 60 of these it would have been
better for the AI or a human driver to take a step contrary to the one
recommended or carried out by the AI. For example, the AI may have
brought the vehicle to a halt, when blowing the horn would have saved the
day. Imagine further that the AI does not appear to have improved over
time. Simpson’s Paradox warns us that the better result might be the
opposite of what the human’s empirical evidence suggests. But is the
human or the AI more likely to err? Arguably, the AI is less likely to fall
prey to a reversal paradox error because it might have tested right away for
the importance of many or all avoidance techniques, whereas the human
appreciated the value of horn-blowing only through an after-the-fact
consideration. It is not enough to say that we can allow the humans and
machines to overrule one another and see which does best in practice over a
long period, because they might face different problems and the difficulty
factor might, once again, be different on the two sides. Even if we wait for a
large sample and divide the data, there could be a reversal within some
categories, or subsets. It may turn out that humans should overrule more
readily in the morning, or that machines are better when the other vehicle is
red. Humans must feed data and there is a limit to what data is offered to the
machine, however superior it might be. Just as the AI does not always ―tell‖
us how it makes a decision, so too the human may be unable to articulate
the source of its ―intuition.‖
IV. LAW AFTER AI OR HUMANS OVERRULE
A. Bigger Data, Deeper Analysis
There are two reasons to think that AI is less likely than humans to be
fooled by reversal paradoxes and statistical errors. The first, as suggested
earlier, is that AI can handle big data. Reversals are more likely to occur
when there is a high level of variance regarding the key variable under
scrutiny in the underlying population. In the presence of substantial
variance, a random sample is more likely to miss critical features of the
population. The initial inquiry generates a biased result when examining the
relationship among variables. With a large data set, the data can be divided

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362563

30

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

[19-Jul-19

into groups and a result tested on the previously excluded data. Once an
omitted variable (such as difficulty or time of day in our previous examples)
has been identified as a critical factor through division and re-testing, it can
be included in future analysis. The larger data set and the inclusion of the
additional variable tighten the variance of the estimated variable of interest,
and increase the degree of certainty in the statistical result.53
The second advantage of AI in this respect derives from its ability to
find connections in data; it looks for things that humans do not know, or
have not the energy, to examine. AI with big data is constructed to examine
the available data (ideally, well collected and accurately labeled) which will
include things like (in the case of autonomous vehicles) the sex or height of
drivers, weather conditions, left-handed drivers, and car models. Humans,
to be sure, must specify the goals; safety is one, but some value needs to be
assigned to time (humans like to get places quickly), manufacturing costs,
and so forth.
The use of big data, especially when unstructured and not organized by
humans, raises the question of whether reversals and other problems are
more serious with AI than with humans. AI is able to identify variables that
ought to be included in structural modeling, even in the absence of a theory
that pointed humans to the variable. In contrast, humans have the advantage
of initial theorizing and hypotheses development and these motivate their
organization, labelling, and interpretation of data. They combat reversals
not by their superiority with data but with knowing what to do with limited
data. At times they can gather and investigate more data to improve their
conclusions. AI’s strength, is its ability to find connections previously
unimagined—and yet this is precisely what invites reversal paradoxes. The
more startling is AI’s discovery, the less it should be trusted, both because it
has not been refined and because it may be explained by yet another
previously unseen variable. On the other hand, AI is less likely to be misled
by reversal paradoxes, because it looks for more connections and thus
discovers the source of reversal paradoxes that might befuddle humans.
Both AI and humans can minimize the reversal problem with the use of big
data. To repeat, AI will be guilty of reversal errors because it sees
53

This is but one of many good reasons to divide data – a practice not yet appreciated
in empirical work in law. Here, data division and testing might reveal the significance of
new variables. This practice is also relevant for predictive models. See DOMINGOS, supra
note 41 at 75 (noting that hypothesized patterns should be tested on held-out data to combat
overfit and that doing so ―is just applying the scientific method … to machine learning: it’s
not enough for a new theory to explain past evidence because it’s easy to concoct a theory
that does that; the theory must also make new predictions, and you only accept it after
they’ve been experimentally verified‖).
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connections where there is no theory or reason to expect these connections
to matter; as a result, it is in danger of missing other variables that reverse
the finding. This might be mitigated by dividing data or using other
techniques, but the danger remains. On the other hand, inasmuch as AI can
consider many times more variables, or theories, than a human, it avoids
reversals to which humans will fall prey; AI is more likely to find the very
variables that caused reversals in the hands of humans. Our intuition is that
the second effect is greater than the first, but further work on this matter is
required.
B. Standards to Rules
It may be apparent that AI can turn standards into rules.54 When it
suggests more refined speed limits or divides pollution control among
factories on a river,55 it is turning a standard into a rule, or turning a rule
into more refined rules. It promises a more rule-oriented legal system. We
have seen that some of these rules might be misguided by reversal
paradoxes and other problems. In some cases it might not turn standards
into rules; it could, for example, reveal that some or all humans do a better
job of predicting repeat offenders or safe drivers than any AI, or an AI
developed formula that has been turned over to humans for execution. The
AI might show that, for reasons unknown, Judge A is a fantastic
decisionmaker when it comes to bail. Both humans and AI might succeed
without a capacity to reveal how conclusions are reached. AI might even
show that in some areas humans quite generally, rather than AI, are superior
predictors and lawmakers. But it is likely that these findings in the direction
of standards will be rare compared to the development of new and refined
rules.
As we have seen, more data and catalogued experience promise greater
54

Cf. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92
INDIANA L. J. 1401, 1433 (suggesting that extremely detailed rules, or micro-directives,
announced at the time that they are needed will emerge as the norm and eliminate both
standards and conventional rules, as well as the work of many judges). Note, however, that
while revelations of rules improve oversight they also empower those who would evade
law. See Saul Levmore, Double Blind Lawmaking and Other Comments on the Formalism
of Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 915, 919 (1999). Simultaneous revelation at the moment of
action lowers evasion for a single actor, as a person cannot easily evade an unknown rule,
but there remains a social cost to revelation inasmuch as similarly situated persons learn
something about the rule’s contents by observing its earlier enforcement—even if uniquely
tailored by a machine. If actions are heterogeneous, then learning is less costly in terms of
evasion; on the other hand, heterogeneity may reduce the social value of a rules-based
architecture.
55
As imagined earlier inSection III.A.
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certainty that a specific prescription will achieve its purpose. It is plausible
that law should focus its data collection energy in areas where it presently
uses standards, with an eye on converting them to rules. Both structured and
unstructured inquiries can generate new, testable theories. When this
iterative process leads nowhere, law can continue to use its loose standards
and unrefined rules. In many cases, however, the study of good data will
lead to a new standard, a tightening of a rule, or a switch from a standard to
a rule. It is easy to imagine shifts from long-held practices. Thus, the
Uniform Commercial Code’s obligation that every contract or duty be
performed in good faith, may fall to a tighter standard, such as parties
cannot form contracts which they should know they cannot fulfill,56 or even
to a rule, such as one freeing breachers from liability (and relying on
reputational interests) for contracts of more than $10,000. This sort of
development could come about through the common-law process, but it
seems more likely to be brought about with the deployment of AI. Topic
modeling57 is just one technique for evaluating unstructured data. By
analyzing word counts and clustering across a collection of judicial
opinions, a topic model can reveal specific factual instances where a
standard such as good faith is repeatedly applied, and that revelation can
lead to greater specificity in law.58 It is unlikely that the conventional
common-law method would use this information to alter legal rules. The
larger point here is that AI is likely to cause some standards to give way to
rules, and surely likely to refine inherited rules.
There are at least two ways to enhance data collection and their usage in
law. Law can simply collect more data. But law can go further, and mandate
that data be structured in order to facilitate its collection. For instance, law
might require that driverless cars be placed on a network so that tortious
behavior can be easily defined in relation to aggregated patterns of
56

See U.C.C. § 1-304 (―Every contract or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.‖).
57
Topic modeling is an application of unsupervised learning that finds groups of items
when the analyst is unsure or disinclined to specify a target of inquiry. JULIA SILGE &
DAVID ROBINSON, TEXT MINING WITH R 89 (2017). The algorithm examines documents—
such as judicial opinions, statutes, and regulations—and fits a topic model to the
documents. For instance, a collection of opinions that have been identified as related to
successor liability through a keyword search can be examined by the algorithm, which then
classifies them into broad categories such as cases involving liability evasion, risk
allocation, and bankruptcy. See Frank Fagan, Successor Liability from the Perspective of
Big Data, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 391, 391 (2015). Note that the cases are sorted by the
algorithm and not coded by the researcher. If the latter were true, the analysis would be
supervised, but important topics might be missed.
58
See Fagan, supra note 34 at 26 (noting that legal doctrine can become more
streamlined through algorithmic identification of judicial rationale).
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automated driving.59 Similarly, law might select a subset of consumers and
ask for information about their preferences for various contractual terms in
order to develop personalized default rules for a larger population. 60 As
these examples suggest, more data can lead to greater specificity in
rulemaking. These are examples of AI’s leading to a higher ratio of rules to
standards.61
As machines continue to develop the tools of causal reasoning, they will
face other challenges, perhaps related to omitted and confounding variables
(and certainly related to the identification of relationship structure when the
effects of an intervention cannot be computed) that bring on the problem of
reversals.62 On the other hand, big data and the arrival of more precise
models may virtually eliminate reversals in relatively stationary legal
domains. In those cases, Human-AI combinations may warrant less
overruling. When machine learning suffers from overfit and other future
challenges because of indiscernible patterns in data and variation in context,
then the balance may favor greater overruling. Inasmuch as so much of law
is about disparate conditions and social change, it is easy to see how
standards, that empower human decisionmakers, may have more of a future
than optimists about AI imagine.
C. Rules to Standards
The migration just described can run in the other direction. Data can
show more indeterminacy than previously imagined, and this can cause law
to devolve from specificity to generality. By indeterminate we mean that the
59

See Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability,
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 1611 CAL. L. REV. 1611, 1612
(2017) (advocating that manufacturer liability for autonomous vehicles should be assessed
according to aggregate fleet behavior).
60
See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules with
Disclosure and Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1450 (2014).
61
It seems apparent that greater magnitudes of processed and usable data will lead to
greater rule specificity. For example, knowledge of traffic patterns can teach us where right
turn on red is reasonable and where not. In this case an existing rule (rather than a standard,
like ―turn whenever it appears safe to do so‖) might be refined by big data. In the private
sector with which we are most familiar, the measurement of longer-term student and
societal outcomes can suggest specific rules for admitting applicants to a law school, just as
more data on productive outputs might reveal the ideal gender composition of corporate
boards.
62
See Ilya Shipster & Judea Pearl, Complete Identification Methods for the Causal
Hierarchy, 9 J. MACHINE LEARNING & RESEARCH 1941, 1941 (2008) (describing causal
queries that cannot be computed from the observation of lower-level associative
relationships, cause-effect relationships, or counterfactuals).
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data reveals no correlation, or none that is replicable, where one was
previously assumed. More interesting is the suggestion that the examination
of data will reverse our thinking about the impact of law on behavior or
outcomes.63 A familiar rule may lose its empirical support, and abrogation
or devolution toward a general standard may better serve its agreed-upon
purpose. For example, a rule fashioned to increase diversity within a law
school’s incoming class, or a workplace, may simply prove wrong. Data
may reveal unintended consequences of well-intended legal or private rules.
In such a case, a more precise rule—or, counterintuitively, a switch to a
standard—may be warranted. This pattern of lawmaking can be seen in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. After an unsuccessful attempt at reducing
racial disparity in sentencing decisions with well-defined rules, the law was
changed to return some flexibility to judges.64 This might prove to
accomplish the intended result even if judges cannot explain the basis for
their decision-making, and even where data analysis by the machine is
unable to reveal the basis for these superior decisions – perhaps because
these are not the same for different judges. It is tempting to say that the use
of rules is categorically incorrect in the sentencing domain, and that
standards are simply more appropriate. But this reaction is premature. As
indeterminacy wanes with enhanced data collection and organization, the
availability of precise rules that carry out their intended purpose will
increase. The important caveat that we have emphasized in this Article is
that a legal domain must remain sufficiently stable, or its dynamism must be
at least identifiable. Inasmuch as law offers indiscernible patterns and
changing contexts, machine learning cannot occur.65
For rules to overtake standards, either good theory (and then structured
data) or good data is required.66 Machines are likely to need humans or, put
differently, the combination may outperform either human or machine
acting alone.
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever aims one ascribes to, or wishes for, law, data can play a
significant role is assessing the effectiveness of a given legal rule, its
63

See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, Or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 698-707 (2010) (providing
an overview of the history of the Guidelines and documenting the change from their
mandatory to advisory role).
65
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
66
See supra note 2 (noting the importance of prior knowledge (or theory) in structured
representations of the world).
64
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enforcement, or even the performance of a legal system as a whole.
Artificial intelligence can help lawmakers, and the citizens who evaluate
them, exploit the available data to assess the impact of familiar and
imagined legal rules on such things as wealth distribution, crime rates,
employment rates, and national income. It will soon help us evaluate the
impact of even modest changes in intellectual property law, tax law, and
environmental regulations. But this Article has not sought to convince
skeptical readers that better analysis of data will help lawmakers understand
the effects of the rules they develop. It has focused instead on the impact of
AI on the architecture of law. It has suggested that rules are likely to
become more detailed, and that there will be a dramatic change in the ratio
of rules to standards. On occasion, artificial intelligence will reveal that
standards, administered by conventional regulators and judges, are actually
superior to rules, designed by courts and legislators, aided perhaps by their
machines, who will be anything but artificial.
These changes will rely on the collection of data; the development of AI
suggests that we pay more attention to the scope and accuracy of this
collection. As important, it is time for serious thinking about the
instructions, or goals, communicated to artificial intelligence. We are likely
to pay more attention to what it is, exactly, that we want law to accomplish,
because the details of legal rules will be formulated by artificial intelligence
as much as by humans. This is so even though artificial intelligence is
inevitably imperfect, as we have explained in this Article. But the reasons
for AI’s fallibility, including overfitting, reversal paradoxes, and flawed or
troubling goals (normally introduced by humans) are hardly new, inasmuch
as human lawmakers can be criticized for making the same mistakes. The
question for the future is not whether machines are perfect, but rather
whether we can identify the tasks in which machines, combined with
humans or acting alone after receiving instructions, are superior to the
humans we currently glorify as judges, regulators, legislators, and enforcers.
***
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